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This paper examines the economic rationale of affordability exemptions in the context of a health insurance
mandate.  On its face, an affordability exemption makes little sense –it exempts people from purchasing
a good that policymakers believe benefits them.  I provide an economic definition of affordability
and discuss how it is implemented in the contexts of food, housing, and health care.  Affordability
standards are frequently used in food and housing policy making, but both empirically and theoretically
health care operates quite differently than do these other merit goods.  These differences help explain
why the use of affordability in health policymaking is so different from its use in these other contexts.
I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between mandates and exemptions in other health
care systems.
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In 2006, Massachusetts passed its path-breaking universal health care reform, 
which incorporates a mandate requiring that all state residents obtain coverage.  The plan 
envisioned that subsidies would be available to assist low- and moderate-income 
residents in purchasing the newly-mandated coverage.  The state legislature, however, 
was unable to fund the necessary subsidies in full.  To address this problem, the State 
determined that the mandate would apply only to those deemed to be able to afford 
coverage.  The regulatory agency responsible for administering the new program, the 
Commonwealth Connector Authority, was required to develop an affordability schedule, 
based on incomes and premium costs, that declared who would be exempt from the 
mandate.  In total, about 1-2% of Massachusetts residents were deemed exempt from the 
mandate in 2007 (http://www.statecoverage.net/programs-massachusetts.htm). 
The term affordability has long been used as a descriptive measure in analyses of 
medical care costs. For example, a 1999 Commonwealth Fund study described those who 
“skipped needed medical care in the past year because of cost” as people who “can’t 
afford to get sick.” (Budetti et al., 1999)  It is also often used in contexts involving health 
insurance.  In research examining how changes in health care costs affect the number of 
people who hold health insurance, Todd Gilmer and Richard Kronick (2005)  develop an 
“affordability index”, which compares per capita health spending and median incomes.  
They find that this affordability index strongly tracks the uninsurance rate.  Similarly, 
studies of the efficacy of tax credits in leading to voluntary expansions of coverage also 
consider the “affordability of individual health insurance” in making forecasts (Hadley 
and Reschovsky, 2002).   3
  There is also a long tradition of using assessments of affordability in making 
allocations of publicly supported goods and services.  The allocation of welfare-based 
income support and food stamps (among other benefits) is based on an assessment of the 
affordability of food.  Housing policy also uses an explicit affordability rule in allocating 
subsidies. 
  Despite these compelling descriptive and prescriptive precedents, the use of the 
affordability standard in the context of the Massachusetts mandate is quite novel.  Unlike 
the food stamps and housing support examples, residents of Massachusetts who do not 
meet the affordability standard will not be provided with public subsidies or benefits – 
rather, they will be exempted from the requirement to purchase health insurance coverage 
in the private market and may remain uninsured.  This paper examines the economics 
behind the idea of affordability, describes how the idea of affordability is implemented in 
practice, evaluates the rationale of the affordability exemption by comparing health care 
services and other merit goods, and considers alternative strategies for addressing flaws 
introduced by an affordability exemption in the context of a mandate. 
 
I.  The Economics of Affordability 
In standard welfare economics, individual’s choices over goods and services are the 
basic currency of analysis.  The accepted measure of preferences is the willingness of an 
individual to pay for a good or service.  Economists are generally not interested in why 
someone is unwilling to pay for a good or service.   
The term affordability as used in ordinary life implies that the primary reason that 
someone chooses not to purchase a good or service is that the person does not have the   4
ability to pay for it – that is, it distinguishes between non-purchase related to income and 
non-purchase related to preferences.  Thus, for example, when the “Dress Like Lindsay 
Lohan” website urges readers “if you can't afford to spend thousands on a purse you'll 
carry once, find a knock-off,” the underlying assumption is that the reader would want to 
buy such a purse if only the resources were available 
(http://www.ehow.com/how_2098814_dress-like-lindsay-lohan.html).  
The ordinary use of the term affordability, however, is insufficient for most public 
policy purposes.  It is a descriptive term, meaning essentially the same thing as that a 
good is normal –consumers would buy more of it if their income increased.   The public 
policy use of the term affordability is normative, not descriptive.  Policymakers are 
concerned about whether a household can afford to purchase a pre-defined quantity of a 
merit good.  A household is said to “afford” such a purchase if it would be left with 
enough income to meet its other socially-defined minimum needs.  Thus, as Hancock 
(1993) explains, “this is the essence of the concept of affordability:  what has to be 
foregone in order to obtain housing [the merit good] and whether that which is foregone 
is reasonable or excessive in some sense.” (at p. 129).  Recent work has extended 
Hancock’s analysis to the context of health insurance (Bundorf and Pauly, 2006) and 
health care (Russell, 1996).   
Hancock illustrates his definition of affordability using a simple diagram (see Figure 
1, adapted to the health care/insurance context).  People whose consumption patterns fall 
in the A area, cannot afford the socially desirable minimum quantity of either health care 
or other merit goods.  Those in the B and C area are consuming more than the socially 
adequate quantities of other merit goods and of health care, respectively, but do not have   5
enough income to purchase adequate quantities of both, even if they re-arrange their 
spending patterns.  Those in the F area can afford, and are consuming, more than socially 
adequate levels of health care and of other merit goods.  Those in the D and E areas are 
consuming more than socially adequate quantities of other merit goods  (area D) or of 
health care (area E), and could afford to purchase adequate quantities of health care (area 
D) or of other merit goods (area E) but choose not to do so.   
Hancock’s formulation describes several groups of interest in the context of health 
care and health insurance affordability.  Those in areas A and B are non-afforders.   They 
have neither the ability nor willingness to pay for the socially defined minimum quantity 
of health care.  Those in area D can be described as afforders.  This group buys more than 
the social minimum level of non-health goods, and chooses not to purchase the social 
minimum of health care.  Prior research has shown, for example, that uninsured people 
spend more on housing, alcohol, and tobacco than do insured people with comparable 
income levels (Levy and DeLeire, 2003).  Uninsured people with high spending on these 
non-health consumption items may fall into area D (if their excess spending is 
sufficiently high to allow them to pay for health insurance) or into area B (if it is not).  In 
either case, this group’s willingness to pay for health care falls below its ability to pay.   
Some, often uninsured people, fall into area C or area E.  They spend very large 
amounts on health care, neglecting other socially necessary purchases.  For example, 
prior to the passage of Medicare Part D, Representative Kucinich reported that "Seniors 
in my district are splitting pills to make their prescriptions last and going without meals 
to cover refill costs,"  (Baglole, 2003)  Russell  (1996) similarly argues that in low 
income countries, unexpected health expenses may lead families to forego school   6
payments and to sell productive assets.   Bundorf and Pauly (2006) refer to this group as 
“insured non-afforders.”  For this group, willingness to pay exceeds ability to pay. 
 
II.  Operational Definitions of Affordability 
The normative definition of merit good affordability described above is both 
challenging to implement empirically and from a policy design perspective.  It requires 
defining, for each household, the minimum socially desirable level of consumption of the 
index merit good (i.e., health care) and of consumption of other merit goods; assessing 
the prices faced for each of these goods or services; and measuring income.  This exercise 
is likely to be computationally daunting as a research project and intractable as a policy 
standard (for an example, see Renwick and Bergmann, 1993).  Moreover, basing the 
standard of affordability on the prices of other merit goods as well as the index merit 
good means that subsidies associated with the index merit good also indemnify recipients 
against changes in the prices of other merit goods.  From a policy design perspective, this 
cross-indemnification feature would make index good subsidies appear unexpectedly 
costly.  Instead, analysts and policymakers have adopted a variety of more limited, short-
hand rules for affordability.   
The most well-developed affordability standard is that for food.  The standard is 
based on a clearly defined minimum standard for the index good.  Research conducted 
between 1905 and 1960 defined a set of nutritionally adequate bundles of food for 
household consumption and the Department of Agriculture adopted one of these bundles 
as its economy food plan (Fisher, 1992).  The US poverty standard is based on the 
relationship of It then relates the price of this bundle to income.  In 1950, the average 
American household spent about 1/3 of its income on food.  Based on these data,   7
economist Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security administration argued that a family 
was poor if its income was less than 3 times the cost of purchasing this minimally 
adequate food bundle (Fisher, 1992).  The underlying assumption is that a low-income 
family that could afford to purchase food would need to spend the remaining 2/3 of its 
income on other necessary goods.  This measure of food affordability continues to be the 
basis of the federal poverty line today, although critics question its validity given that the 
share of food in household consumption has now fallen below 12% (see Table 2).  
The US Department of Housing and Urban Development similarly bases its criterion 
for housing affordability on a housing standard (adjusted to reflect family size), the cost 
of that standard (measured as local housing prices), and household income.  A household 
is defined as able to afford housing if it pays “no more than 30 percent of its annual 
income on housing. Families who pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing 
are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food, 
clothing, transportation and medical care.”  
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/ 
Bundorf and Pauly  (2006) propose a “behavioral” definition of affordability in the 
context of health insurance.  They argue that health insurance is affordable to a family if 
50% or more of similarly situated families purchase insurance.  Their definition of 
“similarly situated” incorporates family income, family composition, and measures of the 
price of health insurance (either prices or expected expenditures, unadjusted for 
geography).  As Bradley (2008) points out, unobserved heterogeneity in the prices faced 
by different families (both those in the group and non-group markets) makes this 
behavioral calculation suspect.  For example, people who do not hold coverage but   8
appear to be able to afford it may work in jobs that do not provide coverage or that offer 
coverage with very high premium sharing, while those who do not hold coverage may be 
employed in jobs that offer coverage with low premium sharing.  It is particularly 
challenging to identify insured non-afforders using available data.  Information on 
insurance premiums can be used to impute a price of insurance for those who are 
uninsured, but no available data provide information on the price of insurance paid by 
those who currently hold coverage. 
The Commonwealth Connector in Massachusetts determines rules of affordability 
each year 
(http://www.masslegalservices.org/docs/Affordability_Information_Sheet_English.pdf).  
It defines affordability according to the ability of individuals and families to buy 
coverage offered through the Connector.  All coverage offered through the Connector 
meets minimum coverage standards and rates vary by age, but not by health status.  The 
Connector’s affordability standards are based on family income, family size, age, and 
region of residence in the state.  They are calculated by assuming that a household with 
income over 300% FPL should not be required to spend more than a fixed percentage 
(about 5%-8%, depending on income category) of its income on health insurance.  The 
Connector’s affordability rule avoids the problems identified by Bradley (2008) because 
the cost of insurance available to an individual of a given age through the Connector is 
known with certainty. 
In sum, operational definitions of affordability in these different contexts are quite 
similar.  They typically define a minimum standard for the index good only (although this 
minimum standard may vary with household characteristics) and they consider only   9
incomes and measures of the price of the index good.  In all three contexts, the 
affordability standards are normative – they combine a normatively determined minimum 
standard of the index good and a normatively determined share of income that this good 
may comprise.  Only the prices of the index good and the incomes of the population of 
interest are determined objectively. 
 
III.  The Rationale of a Health Care Affordability Exemption:  Comparing Health 
Care and Other Merit Goods 
While the operational definition of health care affordability resemble those used in 
other contexts, health care affordability differs from affordability in other contexts in 
several important ways
1.   These differences help explain the economic logic behind an 
affordability exemption in this context. 
 
Ability to Pay and Willingness to Pay 
One difference between health care and other merit goods occurs in the relationship 
between willingness to pay and ability to pay.  In the context of food, relatively few 
people with the ability to pay for the socially desirable minimum bundle are unwilling to 
do so.  The population of area D is small.  For example, among those with incomes 
between 100-200% of the poverty line in the U.S., who can presumably afford food, less 
than 4% reported food insufficiency (Gundersen and Gruber, 2001).  One reason for the 
use of in-kind transfers of food and housing may be that policymakers fear that if income 
                                                 
1 Note that there is an extensive literature on housing affordability which, among other things, points out 
how much more complex it is to determine housing affordability than food affordability.  The distinctions 
between food and housing are not, however, the same as the differences between health care and these 
other merit goods, so I am not discussing them here.   10
transfers were substituted, the size of area D would grow – that is, people would use 
income transfers to buy other goods in preference to purchasing the socially desirable 
minimum bundle of food and housing.  At the same time, few people are willing to pay 
much more for food than they are able to pay (area E is small).   
The case of housing is somewhat different.  Few people who can afford to purchase 
housing choose to go homeless instead (area D is small).  On the other hand, many people 
live in housing that is normatively unaffordable to them. HUD estimates that 12 million 
people now spends more than 50% of their income on housing 
(http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/index.cfm).  In some cases, these 
purchasing non-afforders go without other merit goods to pay for housing.  For example, 
low income households reporting food insufficiency pay nearly 1/3 more for housing than 
do similar households that are not food insufficient
2.   In other cases, the apparent 
mismatch occurs because of errors of classification (Thalmann, 1998).   
In health care, the number of people who fall into both areas D and E is quite large.  
Bundorf and Pauly (2006) estimate that about half of uninsured people could afford to 
purchase insurance coverage (area D).  Similarly, many other uninsured families can 
afford coverage because they are eligible for free or low-cost public insurance coverage 
that they have not taken up.  It is more difficult to ascertain the number of people who 
spend more than they can afford on health care and insurance.  Based on Bundorf and 
Pauly’s (2006) estimates, roughly 10% of privately insured people have health insurance 
but appear to be unable to afford it (area E), but this figure may reflect people who face 
exceptionally low prices for health insurance.   
                                                 
2 Difference is not statistically significant however.   11
Data on health care spending by people without health insurance provides another 
measure of the number of people willing to pay more for care than they can afford.   I use 
the 2005 MEPS to look at expenses for health care among the uninsured (Table 1).  I use 
a standard of 1.5% of income as the threshold for underconsumption of care and a 
threshold of 30% of family income as a threshold for non-affordability.  I repeat the 
analyses using out-of-pocket expenses for care.  I find that about 1/2 of all uninsured 
individuals and families incurred total health expenses of less than 1.5% of income in a 
year, and about 2/3 spent less than 1.5% of income out of pocket on health care.  At the 
same time, many uninsured people incur substantial health care bills.  More than ¼ of 
low income (100-125% FPL) individuals incurred health care expenses equivalent to 
more than 30% of their total income and nearly ¼ spent 30% of their income on out-of-
pocket medical expenses.  High medical spending was not unusual even among higher 
income uninsured people.  Among uninsured people with incomes over 400% FPL, 13% 
incurred expenses above 30% of income and about 10% spent over 30% of income out-
of-pocket.  To put these figures into perspective, 30% of income for a person at 100% 
FPL would be about $3000, easily enough to purchase a health insurance policy.  The 
figures for high spending are substantially lower among families, where high health 
spending for one member is offset by low health spending for another.  Nonetheless, 
about 7% of uninsured families incurred health expenses exceeding 30% of their income 
and about 2% spent more than 30% of family income on health care.  In a developing 
country context, Russell (1996) finds that very substantial proportions of those who need 
care forego other necessities to pay for it.      12
The large number of people who apparently can afford coverage – and may spend the 
price of coverage on out-of-pocket medical expenses -- but choose not to buy coverage 
reflects, in part, the failures of health insurance markets.  If insurers cannot or do not 
charge premiums that accurately reflect an individual’s risk status – either because 
regulations prohibit such rating or because the administrative costs of doing so are 
excessive – some healthy people who can afford current premiums will choose, instead, 
to remain uninsured.  This adverse selection behavior can undermine the functioning of 
insurance markets and make it difficult to cross-subsidize high risk people.  One 
important rationale for mandates is to compel uninsured afforders to purchase coverage 
and shore up this market (Glied, 2008).  Unlike uninsured afforders who self-select out of 
coverage, those who do not participate in the insurance market because they cannot 
afford coverage do not contribute to adverse selection-induced market failure.  From an 
insurance market perspective, they need not be compelled to participate in the insurance 
market. 
 
Health Care Demand and Insurance 
Much of the literature on affordability focuses on uninsured afforders.  As the data 
above suggest, however, the mismatch between ability to pay and willingness to pay in 
this context goes in both directions.  A substantial number of households spend much 
more than they can normatively afford on health care.  
The literature on affordability in the health context refers sometimes to health care 
expenditures and sometimes to health insurance, a means of financing these expenditures.    13
This aspect of the mismatch between ability and willingness to pay stems, in part, from 
the nature of the demand for health care and the distinction between these two concepts.   
Both the willingness to pay for food and, as the Department of Agriculture assumed 
in its construction of the minimum food basket, the socially defined minimum basket of 
food are quite stable over time for a given individual.  The same is true of housing.  The 
value of medical care to an individual and the socially defined minimum quantity of 
health care, however, vary substantially over time as underlying health status varies.   
The range in the cost of the minimum health basket for the same individual is 
enormous.  Care at the most costly end of this range will be unaffordable to a substantial 
majority of the population.  As Nyman (1999) points out, an important rationale for the 
purchase of insurance is to gain access to this necessary but unaffordable care. The access 
function of health insurance means that those who have purchased health insurance are 
unlikely to become purchasing non-afforders (area D).   
As the data in Table 1 (and a voluminous literature on skewed health expenditures) 
suggest, the distribution of health care expenditures is highly varied and uncertain.  
Health insurance allows people to transform this uncertain distribution of medical 
expenses into a predictable premium.  This premium encompasses the expected costs of 
treatment for very costly (unaffordably costly) low probability illnesses as well as the low 
costs of routine and preventive care.  The premium will generally be greater than the 
mean of this distribution, because loading costs (and costs associated with moral hazard) 
are built into the premium.   
The affordability of health care and of health insurance are formally related.  An 
individual may be able to afford health insurance but be unable to afford all elements of   14
the potential distribution of health care expenses.  By contrast, if there were no loading, a 
person who could afford all elements of the distribution of health care expenses could 
necessarily also afford health insurance.  Since the costliest elements of the distribution 
of health care expenses are many times greater than the mean of that distribution, and the 
loading rate is generally below 2, it will generally be the case that those who can afford 
all elements of the distribution of health care expenses can afford health insurance.  The 
set who find health insurance affordable is a subset of those who find health care 
affordable. 
The willingness to pay for health care and the willingness to pay for health insurance  
are not formally related in this way.  At the moment of an extreme medical crisis, nothing 
is more important than health care, and families will willingly incur tremendous expense 
to treat an urgent illness.  On the other hand, when health care needs are not pressing, 
many families will go without routine and preventive care.  With respect to health 
spending, the same individual may appear as a purchasing non-afforder – buying very 
costly urgent care -- (area D) and a non-purchasing afforder – failing to buy routine and 
preventive care -- (area E) at different points in time, as health needs change while 
income remains constant.   
Health insurance premiums provide future benefits but may not be a critical or salient 
expense at the time that they come due.  Few families are likely to impoverish themselves 
to make health insurance premium payments, although they may be willing to pay 
substantially more than the premium amount for care in the event of a health catastrophe.  
For example, poor households who report food insufficiency are significantly less likely   15
to hold health insurance than are other equally poor households (Gundersen and Gruber, 
2001).   
There is nothing analogous to health insurance in the market for other merit goods, 
such as food or housing (although home ownership comes closer).  Each of these goods is 
salient and yields benefits at the point of purchase.  Except for a tiny minority who suffer 
from addictions or disorders, we anticipate and observe that most people’s ability to pay 
for these goods is largely consistent with their willingness to pay for them.  The same is 
true of urgent medical care.  It is hard to imagine public policymakers mandating the 
purchase of food, housing, or urgent care.   
A second piece of the logic behind health insurance mandates is that people make 
inappropriate decisions in choosing whether to pay for care or for coverage.  In the 
context of Figure 1, however, only those in Area D – who could afford insurance 
coverage but choose not to buy it – are behaving inappropriately with respect to insurance 
purchase.  Those who cannot afford coverage do not even have the opportunity to make 
this inappropriate decision.   
Uninsured non-afforders may, however, make other socially inappropriate health care 
purchasing decisions.  The large proportions of uninsured individuals and families in 
Table 1 who spend only tiny amounts on medical care each year – less than the likely 
cost of routine and preventive care --  pose a distinct policy problem.  Insurance that 
covers the socially desirable health care bundle – such as the Commonwealth Connector 
basic coverage package –effectively subsidizes the cost of these routine and preventive 
care services at the point of service through less than 100% cost-sharing.  Mandate 
coverage encompasses these benefits because policymakers believe that they are   16
underused.  Those exempt from the mandate for reasons of unaffordability will not 
benefit from these implicit subsidies and will not increase their use of routine and 
preventive services. 
 
The Safety Net 
The social value of merit goods is reflected in the fact that both governments and 
charitable organizations provide a safety net of services for these goods.  In each case, the 
safety net exists in parallel with a more formalized system that provides resources for the 
purchase of merit goods:  soup kitchens and food stamps; homeless shelters and Section 8 
vouchers; medical care in emergencies and public insurance programs.  In each case, 
services provided through the formalized system are generally preferred to safety net 
services.  Services provided through the safety net offer fewer choices, are usually of 
lower quality, and are less reliably available than formalized services.  Most people 
would prefer to purchase their own selection of very basic food to relying on a soup 
kitchen, and would prefer living in their own housing, however shabby, to relying on a 
homeless shelter.  Similarly, though perhaps less strikingly, obtaining medical services 
through insurance coverage is likely to be preferred to relying on emergency medical 
care.  
The design of the health care safety net addresses a part of the health care 
affordability problems described above for people who lack insurance coverage.  Like 
insurance, the safety net ensures that people have access to (some) services whose cost 
exceeds their income.  It also works, in combination with bankruptcy laws, to protect 
people from impoverishing themselves to meet their immediate health care needs.  As the   17
data in Table 1 suggest, many families who incur substantial health care costs do not 
incur proportional out-of-pocket costs.  The health care safety net, however, does not 
provide all the services included in the socially desirable health care bundle.  In 
particular, it provides very limited routine and preventive health care. 
Although the safety nets for food, housing, and medical care serve similar purposes, 
their nature is quite different.  The services provided through the food and housing safety 
nets are not only of lower quality than analogous purchased goods, they are also 
inexpensive to produce and consumers would not be willing to pay much for them.  By 
contrast, services provided for medical care in emergencies are among the costliest 
components of the health care bundle and consumers have (as suggested above) a higher 
willingness to pay for these services than for most other medical services.   
All safety nets generate some moral hazard – some people who might be able to 
purchase goods on their own will rely on the safety net instead.  The nature of the health 
care safety net, however, means that this behavior is more likely in the case of health 
insurance than in the case of food or housing.  A final rationale for mandates is to avoid 
this type of “free-riding” on the safety net.  The affordability exemption allows those who 
cannot pay for the cost of the safety net services they use to continue to use them at less 
than full cost. 
 
IV.  Rethinking Affordability in the Context of Mandates  
 
A mandate affordability exemption, such as that in Massachusetts, serves an 
important political purpose.  Governments who cannot fund adequate subsidies recognize 
that forcing lower middle income people to spend a large share of income on medical   18
insurance would be unpopular and likely counterproductive.  At second glance, however, 
the notion of an exemption seems outlandish.  The government is saying that those who 
cannot afford health insurance do not need to have it.  This seems a peculiar way to treat 
a merit good.  It is hard to imagine a government telling people who cannot afford food 
that they are not compelled to eat! 
As the discussion above suggests, however, there is economic logic behind an 
affordability exemption from the health insurance mandate.  Three central purposes of a 
mandate are to stabilize the private insurance market; compel people who might delay or 
neglect to buy coverage to make rational purchasing decisions; and reduce free-riding 
with respect to the safety net (Glied, 2008).  Uninsured non-afforders do not contribute to 
insurance market instability because they do not self-select out of the market.  They do 
not make irrational insurance purchasing decisions – they fail to buy coverage primarily 
because they cannot afford it.  They do not free-ride on the safety net, because they do 
not have the resources to pay for the safety net services that they do use. 
While logical, however, an affordability exemption leaves one important social goal 
unaddressed.  An exemption does nothing to improve the delivery of preventive and 
routine services to uninsured non-afforders.  Uninsured non-afforders will continue to 
experience worse health and continue to use safety net services in inefficient ways.  The 
affordability exemption makes sense only as a stop-gap measure, leaving a minute 
fraction of the population uninsured but allowing many of the benefits of the mandate to 
be realized during a brief interval before the state finds enough money to realize the full 
subsidy program.   19
Unfortunately, however, the number of exempt non-afforders is almost certain to 
grow rapidly over time.  This rapid growth in the number of non-afforders, too, reflects 
differences between health care and other merit goods.  
 
Affordability over Time 
Housing, food, and medical care are all normal goods, so demand for them rises with 
income.  Food is income inelastic and has been declining as a share of consumption over 
time (Tobin, 1950).  Housing is also income inelastic, in both cross-sectional and time-
series analyses, although housing has risen (slightly) as a share of consumption over time 
(Hansen, Formby, and Smith, 1998).  Medical care, however, appears to be income 
elastic.  In studies across regions, countries, or time, health care spending rises more than 
proportionally with income and, over time, health care spending has increased 
substantially as a share of consumption (Hall and Jones, 2007; Getzen, 2000).  Increases 
in the cost of health care over time reflect a substantial willingness to pay for 
improvements in the quality (and convenience) of care and a correspondingly high rate of 
technological improvement.     
The varying income elasticities of different merit goods are reflected in data on the 
composition of consumption over time (Table 2).  Data on consumption patterns does not 
include consumption of medical care that is paid for by public insurance or by employer-
sponsored insurance.  I adjust for this by subtracting from the consumption data all 
medical care expenses, adding national per capita average health care spending as a 
measure of average medical care consumption, and adding national per capita average 
health care spending to income to reflect the taxes and wages foregone that fund this   20
consumption.  On average, the food share of consumption has fallen by nearly 2/3 since 
1950.  The housing share of consumption has risen by 3 percentage points.  The health 
care share of total consumption has risen by more than 10 percentage points. 
The income elasticity of merit goods has implications for the determination of the 
social minimum bundle of each of these goods (Fisher, 1995).  The food standard is least 
affected by changes in income, and has, correspondingly, changed little over time.  
Housing standards have increased over time, and a portion of the increase in 
unaffordability of housing can be attributed to changes in the standard of housing viewed 
as minimally adequate (Quigley and Raphael, 2004).  The minimum socially acceptable 
standard of health care appears to increase briskly over time, as technologies improve and 
as average incomes rise.  As the data for the past 60 years suggests, the proportion of 
average income consumed by the minimum acceptable standard of health care will almost 
certainly rise over time.  In consequence, the fraction of the population who are deemed 
to find coverage unaffordable will likely increase, eventually undoing many of the 
benefits of the mandate.  Below, I evaluate two strategies to address these flaws in the use 
of affordability exemptions. 
 
 
Affordability and the Content of Coverage 
The affordability exemption to a mandate is a binary rule – people either must have 
comprehensive insurance coverage or they may remain uninsured.   An alternative 
strategy would be to use an affordability rule to vary the contents of mandated coverage. 
Comprehensive health insurance provides coverage for both urgent care services and 
for routine and preventive care services.  The safety net, however, provides some   21
insurance-like protections for urgent care services to low and middle income people at 
relatively low cost.  The components of the health care bundle that comprise these safety 
net medical services contribute substantially to both the price and value of comprehensive 
health insurance.  While comprehensive health insurance also provides protection, and 
access, to socially desirable routine and preventive care, the cost of this extra protection 
is generally included within the same premium.  Many people are neither able nor willing 
to pay a full premium to obtain services the most valuable of which would be available to 
them at lower cost through the safety net (Glied, 2003).   
  Rather than exempting this group of uninsured non-afforders from the coverage 
mandate altogether, an alternative strategy would be to mandate that they purchase a 
lower cost (and hence affordable) front-end bare-bones coverage package.  Purchase of 
this package would provide those subject to this modified mandate with an incentive to 
use routine and preventive services and might improve the efficiency of use of the safety 
net.  Depending on the normatively-determined threshold, the premium for this package 
might also defray a portion of the expected costs of using safety net services, particularly 
if the use of routine services led to increases (rather than decreases) in high cost 
treatment.  A two-tiered mandate system would address the goal of ensuring that the 
entire population had incentives to use preventive and routine care and would also keep 
the entire population in the insurance pool, facilitating risk adjustment or insurance 
market reform strategies.   
 
 
The Affordability Threshold 
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A second strategy to improve the functioning of an affordability exemption would be 
to adjust it over time.  Health care, while becoming more costly over time, also becomes 
more valuable over time, as quality increases.  This is evident in data on the relationship 
between costs and coverage.  Increases in the cost of health care do lead to reductions in 
coverage, but the elasticity of coverage with respect to the cost of care is well below 1.  
Gilmer and Kronick (2005) estimate that a 1% increase in health spending relative to 
personal income will lead to an increase of about 246,000 – or about 0.5% -- in the 
number of people uninsured.  People at all levels of the income distribution are willing to 
pay more for better care. 
As critics of the US poverty standard have argued, there is no reason to enshrine in 
policy the spending patterns of fifty years ago.  The declining share of food in family 
budgets negates the logic of a poverty standard calculated as 3 times the cost of the basic 
food bundle.  Likewise, increases in the share of health care in national income might 
lead to adjustments in the affordability threshold.   Such adjustments, however, would 
have to consider the original normative definition of affordability and take into account 
both changes in the cost of health care and changes in the prices and standards of other 
merit goods. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
The Massachusetts affordability exemption is the first use of this standard for 
normative policy making in the United States.  There is a long history of affordability 
exemptions, however, in countries with social health insurance systems, such as Germany 
and the Netherlands.  In both Germany and in the Netherlands, the affordability   23
exemption applied to people whose income exceeded a normatively determined 
threshold.  Those in this group were not compelled to purchase public insurance but 
could choose to purchase private substitute coverage or to remain uninsured.   
As incomes rose in each of these countries, a growing share of the population 
exceeded the exemption income threshold.  The substantial population exempt from 
public insurance coverage created the predictable problems described above:  adverse 
selection against the public insurance coverage pool, poor decisionmaking around the 
purchase of coverage, and free-riding on the public insurance safety net.  Both the 
Netherlands (in 2006) and Germany (in 2009) have now reformed their health insurance 
systems, mandating that everyone purchase coverage.  In Germany, those with incomes 
above the affordability threshold may continue to choose private rather than public 
coverage.  In the Netherlands, all residents may choose from among a range of competing 
plans.  These examples suggest that mandate exemptions may be only a temporary fix in 
the design of health insurance systems. 
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Table 1:  Affordability and Health Care Spending Among Uninsured Individuals and 
Families 











Out of Pocket 
health spending 
> 30% of 
income 
Individuals      
<100%  FPL*  37.6 37.5 50.9 30.3 
100-124%  FPL  45.8 28.8 59.2 23.3 
125-199%  FPL  52.4 20.3 64.8 15.2 
200-399%  FPL  53.8 15.2 67.0 12.4 
400% FPL +  60.8  13.0  74.4  9.8 
Families      
<100% FPL*  37.1  18.2  58.1  9.1 
100-124%  FPL  48.9 9.7 67.4 1.8 
125-199%  FPL  50.6 6.8 66.3 1.5 
200-399% FPL  47.4  2.5  68.6  0 
400% FPL +  59.0  5.9  80.5  2.5 
Source:  MEPS 2005.  Family sample consists of families in which all members are full 
year uninsured.  *Families and individuals with incomes below $2000 excluded.  ** 
Total spending estimates are adjusted for uncompensated care use using the methods 
described in Hadley and Holahan, 2003. 
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Table 2:  Adjusted Consumption Shares for US Families 
 1950  1960 1972 1986 1996  2006
Health Care*  4.4%  5.3% 7.4% 10.0% 12.6%  14.5%
Food 29.9%  24.6% 19.1% 14.2% 12.7%  11.4%
Housing 27.4%  29.9% 30.5% 28.7% 29.6%  30.6%
Transportation 13.5%  14.9% 19.1% 18.5% 17.3%  16.0%
Clothing 11.6%  10.5% 7.7% 5.7% 4.7%  3.5%
Other 13.1%  14.7% 16.2% 22.9% 23.1%  23.9%
Source:  Consumption data from US Department of Labor, 100 Years of Consumer 
Spending:  Data for the Nation, New York City, and Boston.  
http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/.  Data for 1996 from Table 26, 1984 from Table 23; 1972 
from Table 20; 1960 from Table 17; 1950 from Table 14.   
Health care as a share of GDP for 1960-2006 from National Health Accounts, CMS, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAccountsHistori
cal.asp 
*Health care as a share of GDP for 1950 from Stephen Joseph Williams and Paul Roger 
Torrens.  Introduction to Health Services.  Thomson Delmar Learning, 2001; Table 5.1 
Data are adjusted by substituting health care as a share of GDP for consumption data 
medical care estimate and adjusting the denominator by subtracting the consumption 
data medical care share and adding the health care share of GDP.   
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Figure 1:  Defining Affordability 
 
Based on Hancock, 1993. 
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